State of New York Public Employment Relations Board Decisions from March 16, 2005 by New York State Public Employment Relations Board
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
Board Decisions - NYS PERB New York State Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) 
3-16-2005 
State of New York Public Employment Relations Board Decisions 
from March 16, 2005 
New York State Public Employment Relations Board 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/perbdecisions 
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR. 
Support this valuable resource today! 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the New York State Public Employment Relations Board 
(PERB) at DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been accepted for inclusion in Board Decisions - NYS PERB by an 
authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. For more information, please contact catherwood-
dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
State of New York Public Employment Relations Board Decisions from March 16, 
2005 
Keywords 
NY, NYS, New York State, PERB, Public Employment Relations Board, board decisions, labor disputes, 
labor relations 
Comments 
This document is part of a digital collection provided by the Martin P. Catherwood Library, ILR School, 
Cornell University. The information provided is for noncommercial educational use only. 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/perbdecisions/574 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK STATE CORRECTIONAL 
OFFICERS AND POLICE BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-24704 
- and -
STATE OF NEW YORK (DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTIONAL SERVICES), 
Respondent. 
HINMAN STRAUB P.C. (NATALIE A. CARRAWAY and RICHARD E. 
CASAGRANDE of counsel), for Charging Party 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (MAUREEN SEIDEL of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the State of New York (Department 
of Correctional Services) (DOCS) from a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
that found that DOCS violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment 
Act (Act) when it unilaterally imposed restrictions on the size and number of containers 
that employees in the unit represented by the New York State Correctional Officers and 
Police Benevolent Association, Inc. (NYSCOPBA) are permitted to bring to their 
workstations in the correctional facilities. 
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DOCS filed an answer, alleging that the subject of the improper practice charge 
is not mandatorily negotiable and that NYSCOPBA waived its bargaining rights 
regarding the charge. 
EXCEPTIONS 
DOCS alleged in its exceptions that the ALJ erred on the facts and the law, in 
particular, that the ALJ misapplied the balancing test of employer-employee interests to 
determine the negotiability of the subject. NYSCOPBA concurs with the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
The facts, as relied upon by the ALJ,1 are disputed by the parties. The facts, as 
we find them to be established in the record, are set forth below. 
In July 2003, DOCS' Associate Commissioner, Kevin Breen, contacted 
NYSCOPBA's Executive Vice President, Carl Canterbury, to schedule a meeting to 
discuss gate procedures at the correctional facilities. On July 15, 2003, Canterbury and 
NYSCOPBA President Richard Harcrow met with DOCS Deputy Commissioner Lucien 
Leclaire and Director of Labor Relations Peter Brown to discuss a change in the method 
of transporting personal items and food into DOCS facilities. Leclaire had circulated a 
memorandum dated June 16, 2003 to all superintendents2 and to the heads of the 
employee organizations that represent employees of DOCS.3 In addition to requiring 
that all packages be searched, the document stated: 
1
 37 PERB H4596 (2004). 
2
 Charging Party Exhibit #2. 
3
 Transcript, pp. 252-253. 
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Effective immediately, the carrying of duffel/gym bags, back 
packs or other similar containers into maximum and medium 
security correctional facilities beyond the security man-lock 
is prohibited. . . . 
Staff who are required to carry their lunch to their job 
assignment will be permitted one appropriate lunch 
receptacle; however, they will be required to display the 
contents of such receptacle upon entering and leaving the 
correctional facility. The size of such container is limited to 
10" wide by 12" long by 12" high, which is reasonable to hold 
the employee's food and associated food items.4 
Canterbury stated that during the meeting "it was explained to us that basically 
since the advent of 9/11, that they wanted to beef up security procedures and felt it was 
long overdue and that's what we were there to discuss."5 Canterbury voiced his 
concern over the size of the container that was proposed, stating that the size of the 
container may limit the amount of food an officer can bring in, and whether it would be 
adequate over the course of an eight-hour or sixteen-hour shift.6 
Leclaire's and Canterbury's recollection of the conclusion of the July 15, 2003 
meeting differ. Leclaire stated that he advised Canterbury "if they had any concerns 
that they should let us know." Canterbury's recollection is that DOCS did not want any 
suggestions regarding the size of the food container. Although the proposed policy was 
scheduled to be implemented in one to two weeks from the July 2003 meeting, DOCS 
did not implement the policy until September 4, 2003. 
On September 8, 2003, Canterbury wrote Leclaire a letter expressing his concern 
again over the size of the food container. His other concern dealt with whether 
duffle/gym bags and backpacks would be allowed beyond the pedestrian sally-port. On 
4
 Charging Party's Exhibit 1. 
5
 Transcript, p. 216. 
6
 Transcript, p. 220. 
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October 21, 2003, Breen responded to Harcrow and informed him that NYSCOPBA's 
request for a meeting to discuss these concerns was untimely and, in any event, the 
policy had already been implemented. Breen noted that DOCS would be evaluating the 
policy over the next six months "to determine if any unreasonable hardships exist." 
On December 12, 2003, NYSCOPBA filed its improper practice charge alleging 
that, prior to September 12, 2003, DOCS' policies and work rules did not require a 
search of every container brought into a facility by an employee. Also, DOCS did not 
limit the size or type of containers employees brought into the facilities. The new policy, 
effective September 4, 2003 and September 12, 2003, imposed the following new 
requirements: 
Effective immediately, all containers carried by staff into maximum 
and medium security facilities will be searched at the facility 
entrance upon entering and leaving. 
Effective September 12, 2003, the carrying of duffle/gym bags, 
backpacks or other similar containers into maximum and medium 
security correctional facilities beyond the pedestrian SALLY-PORT 
will be prohibited. 
Staff who carry their lunch to their job assignment will be permitted 
one appropriate lunch receptacle or shoulder bag (purse). The size 
of such containers is limited to 10" wide by 12" long by 12" high. 
At the hearing before the ALJ, NYSCOPBA and DOCS stipulated that: 
there will be no issue with respect to duffle bags, knapsacks, 
backpacks being brought into officers' locker rooms within the 
correctional facilities, wherever those locker rooms may, in fact, 
be located, and . . . . the remaining question or questions that we 
have to deal with here at the hearing is the limitation on the size 
of the containers, bags, whatever an officer would bring, and the 
number of bags or containers that an officer could bring to their 
individual posts . . . . All the other aspects of this charge are now 
no longer what we're asking PERB to decide.7 
Transcript, pp. 210-212. 
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In addition, the parties further stipulated that: 
the issue of security of agency facilities is delegated by GOER 
[Governor's Office of Employee Relations] to that agency so that, in 
essence, GOER would not be the bargaining agent who would sit at 
the table to negotiate that [security] but rather the agency . . . 
representatives would have the ability to make agreements on the 
issue of security of their facilities. 
NYSCOPBA produced several witnesses to testify regarding the impact of the 
new DOCS policy on the employees in its bargaining unit. Lyndon Johnson, Vice 
President of the Northern Region, stated that correction officers in his region voiced 
concern that the new policy restricted the amount of food and/or drink they could bring 
into a facility. He noted that the facilities in the Northern Region do not provide free food 
to the officers, but that there are vending machines to obtain various food items. 
Johnson's testimony also noted that none of the officers complained that they could not 
bring water or soda to their post under the new policy. 
Paul Mikolajczyk, Vice President of the Southern Region, stated that he received 
complaints similar to ones received by Johnson. He also noted that food is available 
through vending machines. Joseph Green, Business Agent for the Western Region, 
expressed similar concerns voiced by the members in his region. 
Lawrence Flanagan, Vice President of the Mid-Hudson Region, described the 
events that took place at a meeting between Leclaire, Breen, Harcrow and himself on 
September 15, 2003. They met to discuss NYSCOPBA's concerns with the gate 
procedure that had recently been implemented. The main topic of their conversation 
was the restriction on the size of the lunch box. Flanagan brought to this meeting his 
own lunch box and another for consideration. At the hearing, he produced his lunch box 
but was unable to describe its size. However, on further investigation, it measured 10" x 
15" x 15". While he noted that he and Harcrow agreed with the DOCS representatives 
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that there was a need to heighten security, Flanagan stated that one of the first 
concerns of NYSCOPBA members was the limit on the size of the lunch box that DOCS 
allowed because it is too small to contain the amount of food that a correction officer 
brings for an eight-hour shift. He explained that, for example, an officer could not pack a 
submarine sandwich into the size container authorized by DOCS. 
DOCS' sole witness, Leclaire, explained that he is responsible for the day-to-day 
operations of all 70 correctional facilities. The primary mission of DOCS is the security 
and control of these facilities where over 21,000 uniformed personnel are employed, a 
majority whom are affected by the new policy. 
DOCS' policies cover the control of, and search for, contraband in correctional 
facilities. Leclaire noted that, prior to September 2003, there had been incidents 
involving staff who brought contraband into the facilities, such as television sets, video 
cassette recorders, computers, video games, and an electric "sawzall". He described an 
incident in early 2003 when an individual impersonated a correction officer and carried a 
bag into the facility. Although the imposter was stopped, a search of his bag found 
escape paraphernalia, including correction officer uniforms and a chemical agent 
container. Leclaire and others concluded that a vulnerability of DOCS' system had been 
exposed which required a reappraisal of security procedures. This incident led to 
developing the new procedures implemented in September 2003. 
Leclaire stated that before distributing the June 16, 2003 memorandum, he 
deployed members of his staff to visit stores like Wal-Mart in an effort to determine the 
size of containers suitable to meet the needs of staff who might have to work a double 
shift. Leclaire produced a soft-sided container for the ALJ that measured 10" x 12" x 12" 
into which ten Tupperware containers were stored, together with a bottle of water. 
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Leclaire indicated that the policy did not require that a bottle of water be carried inside 
the container. Leclaire testified that there was a relationship between the size of the 
container and the security of the facility, because: 
correction officers only needed to carry a limited number of 
items beyond their uniform equipment to their job each 
day... the container that was allowed... provided some 
flexibility to carry other items [besides food] but it is also 
restricted in size so we could fairly expeditiously look 
through these as we processed dozens, if not hundreds, of 
staff during staff changes.8 
Although Leclaire agreed that correction officers and correction sergeants are not at 
liberty to leave a facility during their scheduled shift to purchase lunch, he noted that 
food is delivered to facilities, there are vending machines and, in some facilities, 
provisions for an employee mess. 
DISCUSSION 
DOCS, in its exceptions, argues that the ALJ failed to consider the facts and the 
law when deciding that the subject matter was a mandatory subject of bargaining. In 
support of this argument, DOCS refers to State of New York (DOT)9 where we 
determined that: 
[T]he Act requires negotiations about "terms and conditions of 
employment." In a very real sense, the determination regarding 
the negotiability of all terms and conditions of employment is 
premised upon a balancing of employer-employee interests. A 
very few subjects have been prebalanced . . . . A balance of 
interests is undertaken, directed again to the nature of the 
subject matter in issue. 
In that decision, we rejected a "facts of the case" approach advocated by the 
employee organization in favor of an assessment of negotiability based upon the nature 
B
 Transcript, pp. 269-270. 
9
 27 PERB H3056, at 3131 (1994). 
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of the subject matter of the work rule.10 We have held that "simply because a work rule 
relates to the employer's mission, it does not follow that the employer is free to act 
unilaterally in the manner in which it chooses to act."11 However, once faced with the 
need to act in furtherance of its mission, we have held that: 
the employer may unilaterally impose work rules which are 
related to that need, but only to the extent that its action does 
not significantly or unnecessarily intrude on the protected 
interests of its employees. Thus, we must weigh the need for 
the particular action taken by the employer against the extent to 
which that action impacts on the employees' working 
conditions.12 
In order to satisfy this test, however, we require that the employer demonstrate that the 
new work rule does not go beyond what is needed to further its mission.13 
It is undisputed that DOCS' concern focuses on the safety and security of the 
facility and the community at large. The question that we must resolve is whether the 
new work rule goes beyond what is necessary to further DOCS' mission. 
NYSCOPBA does not dispute DOCS' right to search for contraband that might be 
carried into a facility. 
Accordingly, the issue to be resolved is the negotiability of DOCS' imposition of 
limitations on the size and number of containers used to carry food that officers may 
bring to their posts. While DOCS officials have elected to make the size of the container 
uniform, it is undisputed that, prior to the implementation of the new work rule, officers 
were allowed to carry their food in containers of different sizes and shapes. DOCS does 
10
 Id. at 3132. 
11




 County of Niagara (Mount View Health Facility), 21 PERB 1J3014 (1988). 
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not dispute the officers' prior practice of bringing their meals into the respective facilities 
and acknowledges that DOCS does not provide free food to its officers and, that not all 
facilities have an officers' mess. At best, in most facilities, food is available at the 
officers' expense either through vending machines or by delivery to the facility. 
The ALJ correctly held that an employee's ability to bring permissible personal 
items to the workplace is a mandatorily negotiable subject because it directly affects the 
employee's comfort and convenience while on the job.14 Here, DOCS does not prohibit 
its officers from bringing their meals into the facilities, but does seek to prescribe the 
dimensions of the containers used to bring the meals into the facility. Leclaire's reason 
for the new work rule was to search for contraband and to simplify that search. 
NYSCOPBA has conceded the need to search for contraband. 
We have held that it is the nature of a balancing test that "when the 
circumstances approach equipoise, subtle distinctions can shift the balance from one 
side to the other."15 Here, DOCS argues that safety and security related to its mission 
predominate over the comfort and convenience of the affected NYSCOPBA unit 
members. 
14
 See County of Nassau, 32 PERB 1J3034 (1999) (bottled water and water cooler at the 
work site); County of Nassau, 32 PERB 1J3005 (1999), enforced, 35 PERB 1J7003 (Sup. 
Ct. Nassau County, 2001) (cafeteria service); State of New York (Dep't of Taxation and 
Finance), 30 PERB 1J3028 (1997) (office attire); New York City Transit Auth., 22 PERB 
1J6601, aff'd on other grounds, 22 PERB 1J6501 (1989) (toilet facilities); City of Buffalo, 
15 PERB 1J3027 (1982) (uniform fabric); Local 294, Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 10 
PERB 1J3007 (1977) (air conditioning and seat style in police patrol cars); Scarsdale 
Police Benevolent Assn, Inc., 8 PERB 1J3075 (1975) (air conditioning in patrol cars). 
See also County of Saratoga and Saratoga County Sheriff, 37 PERB 1J3024 (2004) 
(appeal pending) (telephone use). 
15
 See State of New York (Governor's Office of Employee Relations), 18 PERB 1J3064 at 
3133(1985). 
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We agree that DOCS' mission includes ensuring the safety and security of 
correctional facilities. DOCS' ability to search for contraband in food containers that 
officers may carry into facilities to their workstations advances the safety and security of 
facilities. NYSCOPBA concedes DOCS' right to search officers' food containers for 
contraband. However, DOCS' new policy prescribes the size and number of food 
containers that officers are permitted to carry into facilities. In this respect, the new 
policy adversely impacts the comfort, convenience, and expenses of officers in 
NYSCOPBA's bargaining unit more than it advances DOCS' mission of ensuring safety. 
We find, therefore, that restrictions on the size and number of food containers that may 
be carried to workstations are mandatorily negotiable. 
Based upon the foregoing, we deny DOCS' exceptions and affirm the decision of 
theALJ. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that DOCS will: 
1. Forthwith rescind its restrictions on the size and number of lunch containers 
which employees in NYSCOPBA's bargaining unit may bring to their 
workstations, and restore the status quo ante; 
2. Make affected unit employees whole for losses suffered, if any, as a result of 
complying with the restrictions on the size and number of their lunch 
containers, with interest at the maximum legal rate; 
3. Rescind any adverse employment-related consequences for employees' failure 
to comply with restrictions as to the size and number of lunch containers from 
the date the restrictions were imposed until such time as they are rescinded; 
and 
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4. Sign and post the attached notice at all locations customarily used to post 
communications to employees represented by the New York State 
Correctional Officers and Police Benevolent Association. 
DATED: March 16,2005 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the State of New York (Department of Correctional 
Services) (DOCS) in the unit represented by the New York State Correctional Officers and 
Police Benevolent Association, Inc. (NYSCOPBA) that DOCS will: 
1. Forthwith rescind its restrictions on the size and number of lunch containers that 
employees in NYSCOPBA's bargaining unit may use to bring food to their 
workstations, and restore the status quo ante. 
2. Make affected unit employees whole for losses suffered, if any, as a result of 
complying with the restrictions on the size and number of their lunch containers, with 
interest at the maximum legal rate; 
3. Rescind any adverse employment-related consequences for employees' failure to 
comply with restrictions as to the size and number of lunch containers from the date 
the restrictions were imposed until such time as they are rescinded. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
State of New York 
(Department of Correctional Services) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or 
covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
HEWLETT-WOODMERE ADMINISTRATIVE 
AND SUPERVISORY ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-24718 
- and -
HEWLETT-WOODMERE UNION FREE 
SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
IRA PAUL RUBTCHINSKY, ESQ., for Charging Party 
EHRLICH, FRAZER & FELDMAN (JEROME H. EHRLICH of counsel) for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions by the Hewlett-Woodmere Administrative 
and Supervisory Association (Association) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) dismissing an improper practice charge filed by the Association against the 
Hewlett-Woodmere Union Free School District (District) alleging that the District 
unilaterally discontinued a past practice. The practice allowed Association bargaining 
unit members, during non-working hours, to privately tutor for compensation students 
taught by teachers under the supervision of unit members. The District asserted in its 
answer that the charge failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 
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EXCEPTIONS 
The Association contends that the ALJ erred on the facts and the law, by finding 
that the District's work rule prohibiting private tutoring during non-working hours was a 
nonmandatory subject of bargaining. The District contends that its work rule is not a 
mandatory subject of bargaining and concurs with the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and the arguments of the parties, we 
reverse the ALJ's decision. 
FACTS 
The parties submitted stipulated facts to the ALJ on July 13, 2004, in lieu of a 
hearing. The facts are fully set forth in the ALJ's decision1 and are repeated here only 
as necessary to decide the exceptions. 
During the 2002-03 school year, the District had issued a memorandum 
requesting that all District personnel who desired to be on a list of private tutors which 
would be available to parents when requested should identify themselves, the subject(s) 
in which they wished to tutor, and their telephone numbers and e-mail addresses. This 
list contains the names of both teachers and Association bargaining unit members. A list 
was also generated as a result of the responses for the 2003-04 school year. 
On or about September 2, 2003, the District's Superintendent of Schools, Charles 
Fowler, received a letter, dated August 28, 2003, from three officers of the District's 
Parent Teacher Association (PTA), expressing concern about a practice that involved 
department chairpersons and other supervisory staff engaging in private, for pay, 
tutoring of students in the departments or schools where they served as supervisors. On 
or about September 4, 2003, Fowler sent a memorandum addressed to "All 
1
 37 PERB H4585 (2004). 
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Administrative and Supervisory Personnel", directing them to "not engage in the practice 
of tutoring for private compensation students of Hewlett-Woodmere Public Schools who 
are students assigned to teachers who the administrator or supervisor directly or 
indirectly evaluates, or are in a program, at any level, for which the administrator or 
supervisor has program responsibility" because of the conflict of interest or the 
appearance of a conflict of interest that such tutoring engenders. According to the 
memorandum, the potential conflict of interest has three bases: 
(1) The administrator or supervisor in such a situation appears to gain 
financially to the extent that students in the subject area under the 
administrator or supervisor's appointed responsibility require or desire 
experiences beyond that provided in the program being supervised. Ergo, 
to the extent the program being administered and/or supervised is limited 
or inadequately implemented, those engaged in private tutoring, including 
such an administrator or supervisor, may benefit. (2) The administrator or 
supervisor in such a situation appears to gain financially to the extent that 
teachers under his or her supervision may recommend to parents that 
they seek private tutoring to enhance their child's achievement. (3) The 
administrator or supervisor in such a situation may have access to District 
information regarding test construction, student records, etc. which would 
enhance such private practice, (emphasis in original) 
The 2003-04 list of tutors states that it was updated May 14, 2004 and does not contain 
the names of any Association bargaining unit members. 
For several years prior to the issuance of the September 4, 2003 memorandum, 
Association bargaining unit members engaged in the practice of tutoring, for private 
compensation, students assigned to teachers who the unit members directly or 
indirectly evaluated, or students who were in a program, at any level, for which the 
administrator or supervisor had program responsibility. Unit members, however, did not 
tutor students in classes that they taught. The unit members provided the tutoring at 
times other than during regular work hours. Prior to the issuance of the September 4, 
2003 memorandum, and during the years the practice was in effect, the District's 
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Superintendent of Schools and the Assistant Superintendent for Human Resources and 
Student Services were aware of and did not object to the practice. 
DISCUSSION 
In order to establish a past practice, a charging party must demonstrate that the 
practice affected a mandatory subject of bargaining, that the practice was unequivocal, 
and was continued uninterrupted for a period of time sufficient under the circumstances 
to create a reasonable expectation among the affected unit employees that the practice 
would continue.2 
Neither party disputes that the practice in-issue meets the above criteria, if the 
subject matter is a mandatory subject of negotiations. Generally, an employer's 
restriction on employees' use of their nonworking time is mandatorily negotiable.3 The 
Association contends that the seminal question is whether the interests of the District 
predominate over those of the employees. The District asserts that a balance of the 
competing interests renders the work rule in question a nonmandatory subject of 
negotiations. 
In our decision in State of New York (Department of Transportation),4 we 
discussed the procedure to be used to determine whether a particular work rule 
constitutes a mandatory or nonmandatory subject of bargaining. We said that the 
subject matter must first be identified and then the competing employer and employee 
2
 County of Westchester, 33 PERB 1J3025, conf'd 33 PERB 1J7016 (Sup Ct, Albany 
County (2000). 
3
 Ulster County Sheriff, 27 PERB 1J3028 (1994); Local 589, Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters, 16 
PERB H3030(1983). 
4
 27 PERB H3056(1994). 
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interests at stake balanced.5 The subject matter here is the ability of unit employees to 
engage in off-duty work for pay. The interest of the employees to tutor for compensation 
the at-issue categories of District students must then be balanced against the concerns 
articulated by the District that the primary purpose of the work rule is to prevent actual 
or perceived conflicts of interest between the unit members' District jobs and their off-
duty tutoring of District students. 
The ALJ concluded that the work rule in question is designed to prevent conflicts 
of interest, either real or in appearance, and found that the work rule was a reasonable 
measure taken to avoid a conflict of interest, or the appearance thereof, relying on our 
decision in New York State Thruway Authority6 His reliance is misplaced. There we 
found that the employer had established "an objectively demonstrable need to act in 
furtherance of its mission" sufficient to justify the unilateral imposition of a work rule 
related to that need and that the work rule imposed did not significantly or unnecessarily 
intrude on the protected interests of its employees.7 
Here, the Stipulation of Facts establishes only that Fowler, upon receipt of a 
letter from PTA officers relating to the practice, unilaterally eliminated a past practice 
involving a mandatory subject of negotiations. The stipulated facts offer no evidence of 
any real conflict of interest that existed prior to the September 4, 2003 memorandum.8 
As to any apparent conflict, the stipulation notes that, prior to the issuance of Fowler's 
5
 See also State of New York (Department of Correctional Services), 38 PERB 1J3006 
(2005). 
6
 21 PERB H3058(1988). 
7
 County of Montgomery, 18 PERB 1J3077 (1985). 
8
 Annexed to the Stipulation of Facts are six exhibits. Although the document is also 
referred to as a stipulated record, it is unclear whether the parties intended the exhibits 
to be admitted to the record for all purposes or just to evidence the facts stipulated. 
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memorandum, the District circulated a list to all District personnel who were interested 
in tutoring on their own time with the knowledge of both Fowler and the Assistant 
Superintendent for Human Resources and Student Services. It is not unreasonable for 
us to conclude that the Board of Education knew or should have known of the practice 
as it existed prior to September 4, 2003 and yet, there is no claim that the practice 
conflicts with any established Board policy. 
While the letter, dated August 28, 2003, to Fowler from the three PTA Council 
officers expressed their concern over the practice, it also carefully pointed out that they 
were not accusing any supervisors of any real or apparent conflicts of interest. Their 
concerns fail to establish any factual basis supporting an objectively demonstrable need 
to act in furtherance of the District's mission such that unilateral action was mandated.9 
Likewise, there is no evidence of any communication between the Board of Education, 
as the policy-making body, and Fowler that would explain the District's concern, the 
reasons therefor, and why Fowler decided that the memorandum of September 4, 2003 
was the only means available to address his concerns. 
The interests of the Association are easily understood. The interests of the 
District are more ephemeral, less objective and more difficult to assess with regard to 
impact on the District's mission. We cannot help but wonder if the conflicts of interest 
were so apparent, why didn't they occur to any of the parties at an earlier stage? 
Certainly, no one suggests that any of the parties engaged in the practice with the evil 
or sinister intent. On the contrary, all parties seem to suggest that all parties had only 
the best interests of the District's students in mind when they devise and implemented 
9
 See County of Saratoga and Saratoga County Sheriff, 37 PERB 1J3024 (2004) (appeal 
pending). 
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the practice. Even if we assume that bad things can result from the best of intentions, 
we are left to speculate as to how the perception of a conflict has actually or potentially 
harmed the District's mission. Without something more on the District's part, we find the 
interests under the Act tip in favor of the Association. We are loathe to remove this 
matter from the negotiations process or to presume that parties bargaining in good faith 
cannot reach an agreement satisfactory to all. 
Having determined that, on this stipulated record, the interests of the District do 
not predominate, we find that the subject of the work rule, as defined in the September 
4, 2003 memorandum from Fowler, predominantly impacts upon the affected 
Association members' ability to earn money on their own time and is, thus, a mandatory 
subject of bargaining. The record is clear that the District acknowledged the existence 
of a past practice and, until September 4, 2003, there was an expectation among the 
affected Association members that it would continue.10 As the District failed to negotiate 
with the Association prior to implementing the September 4, 2003 memorandum, we 
find that the District violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act. 
Based upon the foregoing, we grant the Association's exceptions and reverse the 
decision of the ALJ. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Hewlett-Woodmere Union Free School 
District: 
1. Immediately rescind the September 4, 2003 policy of prohibiting 
administrative and supervisory employees from engaging in private tutoring 
for compensation of District students who are assigned to teachers in the 
departments or schools which they supervise; 
10
 County of Nassau, 37 PERB 1J3014 (2004) (appeal pending). 
Board - U-24718 -8 
Compensate and/or make whole administrators and/or supervisors for any 
income lost due to their inability to tutor District students as a result of the 
September 4, 2003 policy, with interest at the maximum legal rate; and 
Sign and post the attached notice at all locations ordinarily used to post 
notices of information to employees in the unit represented by the 
Association. 
DATED: March 16,2005 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the Hewlett-Woodmere Union Free School District (District) 
in the unit represented by the Hewlett-Woodmere Administrative and Supervisory Association 
(Association) that the District will forthwith: 
1. Immediately rescind the September 4, 2003 policy of prohibiting administrative 
and supervisory employees from engaging in private tutoring for compensation 
of District students who are assigned to teachers in the departments or schools 
which they supervise; 
2. Compensate and/or make whole administrators and/or supervisors for any 
income lost due to their inability to tutor District students as a result of the 
September 4, 2003 policy, with interest at the maximum legal rate. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
HEWLETT-WOODMERE UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or 
covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
JOYCE E. FEARON, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-25422 
- and -
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, 
Respondent. 
SARA-ANN FEARON, for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions of Joyce E. Fearon to a decision of the 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) which dismissed 
her improper practice charge alleging that the United Federation of Teachers (UFT) 
violated §209-a.2(c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). 
EXCEPTIONS 
Fearon argues in her exceptions that the Director erred in dismissing the charge 
as untimely. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of Fearon's 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the Director. 
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FACTS 
We adopt the Director's findings of fact1 which are repeated here only as 
necessary to decide the exceptions. 
On July 2, 2002, Fearon received a letter from the Board of Education of the City 
School District of the City of New York (employer) that she had been placed on the 
employer's ineligible list at the request of its Office of Special Investigations. On July 9, 
2002, Fearon notified UFT of the letter and requested a hearing pursuant to the 
Chancellor's Regulation C-31. UFT represented Ms. Fearon at the hearing held on May 
9, 2003. On or about August 5, 2003, Ms. Fearon received a letter from her employer 
notifying her that the Chancellor concurred with the hearing officer's recommendation to 
terminate her teaching certificate. 
At that time, she requested a meeting with UFT representatives to discuss a 
possible appeal. On March 10, 2004, Fearon was notified by UFT that it determined 
that, nothing further could be done. 
In all of its correspondence with Fearon, UFT maintained in its correspondence 
that its position with respect to an appeal had not changed. In its final letter to Fearon, 
dated May 28, 2004, UFT again informed Fearon that it would take no further action to 
appeal the Chancellor's decision of August 5, 2003. 
1
 37 PERB H4584 (2004). 
Fearon filed her original charge on September 25, 2004. On September 30, 
2004, the Assistant Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Assistant Director) notified Fearon that her charge was deficient because it was filed 
more than four months after UFT's letter of May 28, 2004. The Assistant Director noted 
that UFT's letter of May 28, 2004 was merely a reiteration of its earlier position 
beginning with its March 10, 2004 letter. Also, the Assistant Director noted that the 
charge did not allege facts sufficient to establish a violation of §209-a.2(c). In response 
to the deficiency notice, Fearon filed an amendment to the charge adding allegations 
asserting that the petition is timely filed. By decision dated November 15, 2004, the 
Director dismissed the charge. 
DISCUSSION 
Our Rules of Procedure (Rules) require that a charging party file a charge within 
four months of the action alleged to constitute an improper practice.2 As a general rule, 
in a duty of fair representation case, the time runs from the date of the at-issue union 
conduct.3 We have interpreted this rule to require that a party file a charge within four 
months of the date when the charging party knew or should have known that his or her 
request to the union has not been granted. Consequently, subsequent reiterations of 
the union's initial decision not to grant a request do not extend the filing period or create 
a new one.4 
Fearon was advised by UFT, on March 10, 2004, that there was nothing further 
UFT could do on her behalf. We find that Fearon's subsequent requests made to UFT 
2
 Rules, §204.1 (a)(1). 
3
 Public Employees Fed'n (Levy), 31 PERB 1J3090 (1998). 
4
 United Fed'n of Teachers, 23 PERB 1J3038 (1990). 
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to appeal the Chancellor's decision and UFT's subsequent correspondence with Fearon 
were merely a reiteration of their previous position. Consequently, we concur with the 
Director's decision that the charge filed on September 25, 2004 and the amendment 
thereto were untimely, having been filed more than four months after the March 10, 
2004 letter from UFT. 
Based upon the foregoing, we deny Fearon's exceptions and affirm the Director's 
dismissal of the improper practice charge. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge herein must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: March 16,2005 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/ John T. Mitchell, Member 
^U^^U^^i-^^3^ 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
STATE OF NEW YORK (DIVISION OF STATE POLICE), 
Petitioner, CASE NO. DR-112 
Upon a Petition for a Declaratory Ruling 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (MICHAEL N. 
VOLFORTE of counsel), for Charging Party 
GLEASON, DUNN, WALSH & O'SHEA (RONALD G. DUNN of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the State of New York (State) to a 
Recommended Declaratory Ruling of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)1 finding that 
certain demands submitted by the Police Benevolent Association of the New York State 
Troopers, Inc. (PBA) to fact-finding are mandatory subjects of negotiation.2 
EXCEPTIONS 
The State excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that Executive Law §215(3) 
makes the at-issue demands prohibited subjects of bargaining. The PBA has filed 
cross-exceptions alleging that the ALJ failed to dismiss the State's petition as untimely. 
Based upon the record before us, we reject the recommended ruling of the ALJ 
and find that the at-issue subjects are prohibited subjects of bargaining. 
1
 37 PERB H6601 (2004). 
2
 PERB's Rules of Procedure §210.2(c), 4 NYCRR 210.2(c). 
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FACTS 
This case had been submitted by the parties on a record consisting of a seven-
page Stipulation of Facts and a Stipulated Record containing of 44 exhibits. On 
January 30, 2002, the PBA filed a petition with PERB's Director of Conciliation 
requesting fact-finding on certain non-monetary issues unresolved in the parties' 
negotiations and mediation.3 A factfinder was appointed on May 28, 2002.4 Thereafter, 
the factfinder held hearings, taking testimony and receiving exhibits, on four dates, the 
last being July 18, 2002.5 
In City of New York,6 the Board held that certain of the police union's demands, 
relating to disciplinary records and procedures, were prohibited subjects of negotiations 
because they involved the exercise of authority that was reserved to the discretion of 
the City Police Commissioner by virtue of the New York City Charter and Administrative 
Code. On August 29, 2003, Supreme Court confirmed that Board's decision and order.' 
By letter dated October 1, 2003, the State formally requested that the PBA 
withdraw from fact-finding, as prohibited subjects, the following demands: 
Article 16 - Members' Rights (Open issue no. 1) 
The procedures set forth in Rule 3 of the NYSP Administrative Manual 
shall be incorporated into Article 16. 
Disciplinary Action (Open issue no. 2) 
Insert the existing provisions of Rule 3 into the Agreement. 
3
 Stipulated Record, Exhibit 15. 
4
 Stipulated Record, Exhibit 16. 
5
 Stipulation of Facts, 1J18. 
6
 35 PERB H3034 (2002). 
7
 Matter of Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 
36 PERB H7014 (2003), aff'd, 13 AD2d 879, 37 PERB 1J7012 (3d Dep't 2004). 
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Discipline (Open issue no. 5) 
All disciplinary hearings will be heard by an independent Arbitrator 
selected from a list maintained by PERB. 
Division shall turn over all documents and notations in any way 
associated with the investigation that led to the member being served 
with administrative charges, 60 days prior to the commencement of the 
said hearing. 
In a reply letter dated October 6, 2003, the PBA rejected the State's request on 
the basis that it was untimely.8 On October 8, 2003, the State filed an Improper 
Practice Charge alleging that the PBA, in violation of §209-a.2(b) of the Public 
Employees Fair Employment Act (Act), failed to bargain in good faith by failing to 
withdraw prohibited subjects from the assigned factfinder.9 The Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation dismissed the charge and that dismissal 
was affirmed by the Board.10 On October 15, 2003, the State filed the Petition for a 
Declaratory Ruling that is now before us. 
DISCUSSION 
The ALJ made no determination as to the timeliness of the State's declaratory 
ruling petition, but the timeliness of the instant proceeding is a threshold issue that must 
be addressed before any other. Were we to find the proceeding untimely, we would be 
without jurisdiction to consider the substantive issues involved. 
B
 Stipulated Record, Exhibit 18. 
9
 Stipulated Record, Exhibit 22. 
10
 Police Benevolent Ass'n of the New York State Troopers, Inc., 37 PERB 1J4501 
(2004), aff'd 37 PERB 1J3008 (2004). 
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The PBA argues that the State's Petition for a Declaratory Ruling should be 
dismissed as untimely because it was filed 20 months after the PBA's petition for fact-
finding and 17 months after this agency's determination in City of New Yorku 
In support of its argument, the PBA cites to County of Rockland2 and City of 
New York.^3 In response, the State argues that the cited cases are inapposite to the 
case at bar and that PERB has no rule establishing a time limitation for filing a Petition 
for a Declaratory Ruling under circumstances involving fact-finding. For the reasons 
stated below, we agree with the State's position on the issue and hereby dismiss the 
PBA's cross-exception. 
Both of the cases cited by the PBA involved a Petition for a Declaratory Ruling 
filed after a Petition for Interest Arbitration had been filed. Section 205.6 of our Rules 
relates specifically to the filing of Improper Practice charges and Petitions for 
Declaratory Rulings related to compulsory interest arbitration. That section of the Rules 
does not govern the situation here, which involves a Petition for a Declaratory Ruling 
related to bargaining demands submitted to fact-finding. In the absence of a specific 
Rule that prescribes the time to file Petitions for Declaratory Rulings related to fact-
finding, we must apply our Rules governing declaratory rulings generally which are 
contained in Part 210. Nothing in Part 210 or the other Rule provisions referenced 
therein, specifically §204.4 and Part 212, contain a time limitation for filing a Petition for 
a Declaratory Ruling. 
11
 Supra, note 6. 
12
 26 PERB H3071 (1993). 
13
 37 PERB H3034 (2004). 
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In fact, we have previously held that a Petition for a Declaratory Ruling may be 
filed despite a party's failure to object to the negotiability of a bargaining demand prior to 
the filing of the petition, and even after the conclusion of fact-finding.14 Here we have a 
similar factual circumstance where the State failed to object to the negotiability of the 
bargaining demand until just before final submission of the case to the factfinder for a 
report and recommendation. 
In the circumstances here, we must consider "...whether the issuance of a 
declaratory ruling would be in the public's interest as reflected by the policies of the 
Act".15 Such broad discretion in agency issuance of declaratory rulings has been 
approved by the Court of Appeals.16 
The purpose of the declaratory ruling proceeding is to provide for a less 
adversarial means than an improper practice proceeding for resolving an existing, 
justiciable issue between the parties concerning, among other matters, the character of 
subjects of negotiations under the Act.17 
Here, we clearly have a justiciable issue regarding the character of certain 
bargaining demands. We find that a determination as to whether those bargaining 
demands constitute prohibited subjects of bargaining, where the same are about to be 
submitted to a factfinder for a report and recommendation, would further the policies 
underlying the Act. Our determination of the negotiability of the demands at-issue would 
promote harmonious and cooperative relationships between the parties by clarifying 
14




 Power Auth. v. NYS Dept. ofEnv'l. Cons., 58 NY2d 427 at 434 (1983). 
17
 Supra, note 13. 
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their bargaining obligations. If we determine the subjects to be prohibited subjects of 
negotiations, we will save the parties time and expense in their negotiations, and we will 
prevent the possibility of the issuance of a factfinder's recommendation containing a 
legally unenforceable provision. To dismiss the petition and allow the case to go to the 
factfinder with the status of the at-issue subjects undetermined would be to invite 
confusion and the potential for a factfinder's report and recommendation which is not 
based on the current state of the law and, which, perhaps, has no chance of acceptance 
if doubts about the negotiability of these demands persist. It serves the policies of the 
Act for us to make a determination as to the status of the at-issue demands given the 
time and expense the parties have invested in their negotiations to date and the length 
of time that these negotiations have been held in abeyance awaiting the outcome of 
these proceedings. 
The fact that we dismissed the State's improper practice charge18 as untimely is 
of no moment here. Our Rules specifically provide an outside limit of four months for a 
party to bring a charge alleging that another party has violated a provision of §209-a of 
the Act. Our prior dismissal was jurisdictional and did not reach the merits of the charge. 
Section 205.6 of the Rules does not apply to the instant case, and there is no rule 
prohibiting a party from filing both an improper practice charge and a Petition for a 
Declaratory Ruling based on the same facts. 
Having decided that the State's petition is timely, we turn to the issue of the 
negotiability of the at-issue demands. The State excepts to the ALJ's decision holding 
that the at-issue demands are mandatory subjects of negotiation by arguing that 
Executive Law §215(3) makes them prohibited subjects. The PBA supports the ALJ's 
Supra, note 10. 
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decision in this regard arguing that CSL §76(4) does not protect Executive Law §215(3) 
and, in fact, requires the State to negotiate about disciplinary procedures. We find the 
at-issue subjects to be prohibited subjects of negotiations. 
Executive Law §215(3) is a general law of the State of New York. That section 
provides, in relevant part, that: 
[t]he superintendent [of the State Police] shall make rules and 
regulations, subject to approval by the governor for the discipline and 
control of the New York state police... 
Civil Service Law §76(4) states, in relevant part, that: 
Nothing contained in section seventy-five or seventy-six of this chapter 
shall be construed to repeal or modify any general, special or local law 
or charter provision relating to the removal or suspension of officers or 
employees in the competitive class of the civil service of the state or 
any civil division. 
The courts have repeatedly held that the above-quoted limiting language 
of CSL §76(4) evidences a legislative intent to prevent long established statutory 
disciplinary provisions from being supplanted.19 While recognizing the applicability of 
these decisions to local government, the PBA argues that they do not apply to state 
government because of the second sentence of CSL §76(4), which reads: "Such 
sections may be supplemented, modified or replaced by agreements between the state 
and an employee organization pursuant to article fourteen of this chapter". 
Given the first sentence of the section, the only rational interpretation that can be 
given to this second sentence is that the words "such sections" refers to CSL §§75 and 
76. That state units might be governed by statutes relating to discipline, other than CSL 
19
 City of Mount Vernon v. Cuevas, 289 AD2d 674 (3d Dep't 2001), Iv denied 83 NY2d 
759 (2002); Rockland County Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n v. Town of Clarkstown, 149 
AD2d 516 (1st Dep't 1994); City of New York v. MacDonald, 201 AD2d 258 (1st Dep't 
1994); Town of Greenburgh v. Ass'n of the Town of Greenburgh, Inc., 94 AD2d 771 (2d 
Dep't 1983). 
Board - DR-112 - 8 
§§75 and 76, is evidenced by the language in the first sentence relating to "...officers or 
employees in the competitive class of the civil service of the state...," which language 
was not amended or repealed with the later addition of the second sentence. We find 
that discipline of the New York State Police is governed by Executive Law §215(3) and 
not by CSL §§75 and/or 76. Therefore, we conclude that the Legislature intended to 
protect from repeal or modification Executive Law §215(3), in the same manner as the 
local and special laws involved in the previously cited cases. 
The PBA relies on a memorandum decision in Sabatini v. Kirwan20 for the 
proposition that the Civil Service Law is generally applicable to the state police absent 
clear legislative intent supporting an exception. The Appellate Division, Third 
Department, clarified its position in a subsequent case, Ward v. Chesworth,21 where it 
stated: 
Although this court has recognized the "broad grant of authority given to 
the superintendent regarding personnel matters" (Burke v. New York 
State Police, 115 AD2d 108, 110, appeal dismissed 67 NY2d 870; see, 
Matter of Wright v. Connelie, 101 AD2d 902, appeal dismissed sub 
nom. Matter of Ford v. Connelie, 63 NY2d 951), we have also applied 
provisions of the Civil Service Law to State Police personnel where the 
statutory grant of authority to the Superintendent does not indicate a 
legislative intent to the contrary. 
Here, the Legislature's grant of authority to the superintendent in Executive Law 
§215(3) to make rules and regulations for the discipline and control of the state police is 
sufficiently clear and contains no indication that the superintendent's rules and 
regulations are subject to supplementation, modification or replacement by agreements 
between the State and an employee organization. 
20
 42 AD2d 1004 (3d Dep't 1973). 
21
 125 AD2d 912 (3d Dep't 1986), Iv denied 69 NY2d 610 (1987). 
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We also find unpersuasive the PBA's argument that, since Executive Law 
§215(3) is silent as to the procedures incident to a hearing, the Court of Appeals 
decision in City of Watertown,22 dictates that such procedures are mandatorily 
negotiable. Watertown held that since the statute in question, General Municipal Law 
§207-c, granted municipalities the right to make an initial determination of an 
employee's right to §207-c benefits, but was silent as to the procedure to be utilized to 
review such determinations, PERB's decision that review procedures were a mandatory 
subject of negotiations was correct. In the case before us, while the statute does not 
explicitly state so, it is "inescapably implicit" that the grant of authority to make rules and 
regulations governing discipline includes the authority to make rules and regulations 
governing the procedures relating to that subject. 
Unlike the language of GML §207-c, the broad grant of authority given to the 
superintendent regarding personnel matters to make rules and regulations includes the 
authority to develop procedures for the discipline and control of the New York State 
police. In fact, such procedural rules and regulations23 are commonly referred to within 
the Division of State Police as "Rule 3", which has governed the parties disciplinary 
processes at all times relevant hereto. 
The fact that the parties may have bargained over other proposed "Rule 3" 
amendments as part of their 1995 - 1999 Memorandum of Understanding24, does not 
change the negotiability of the at-issue demands.25 We do not pass on the wisdom of 
22
 95 NY2d 73 (2000). 
23
 9 NYCRR §§479 et seq. 
24
 Stipulated Record, Exhibit 5. 
25
 City of Troy, 10 PERB 1J3015 (1977); Town of Henrietta, supra, note 14. 
Board - DR-112 - 10 
those past negotiations, but note that any rules or regulations duly adopted enjoy a 
presumption of validity. 
Based on the foregoing, we grant the State's exceptions, deny the PBA's cross-
exception and reject the ALJ's recommended Declaratory Ruling. Accordingly, the 
PBA's demands are non-mandatory, prohibited subjects of negotiation. 
DATED: March 16, 2005 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/ John T. Mitchell, Member 
UA&CUuJi^L~^L^~ 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
VILLAGE OF FLORIDA POLICE BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5459 
VILLAGE OF FLORIDA, 
Employer, 
-and-
UNITED FEDERATION OF POLICE OFFICERS, 
INC., 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Village of Florida Police Benevolent 
Association has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
Certification - C-5459 
- 2 -
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and 
the settlement of grievances. 
—Included;- -All-part-time and full-time-police officers. -
Excluded: Chief of Police and all other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Village of Florida Police Benevolent Association. The 
duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times 
and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: March 16,2005 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PORT WASHINGTON WATER POLLUTION 
CONTROL DISTRICT MANAGEMENT 
ASSOCIATION; 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5467 
PORT WASHINGTON WATER POLLUTION 
CONTROL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Port Washington Water Pollution Control 
District Management Association has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties 
and described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
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negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Included: Superintendent, Assistant Business Manager. 
Excluded: Director, Foremen, Field Unit Employees and Clerical Employees. 
-FURTHER-IT-IS ORDERED-that-the-above named public employer-shall -
negotiate collectively with the Port Washington Water Pollution Control District 
Management Association. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual 
obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. Such 
obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of 
a concession. 
DATED: March 16,2005 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Join T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PORT WASHINGTON WATER POLLUTION 
CONTROL DISTRICT CLERICAL ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5468 
PORT WASHINGTON WATER POLLUTION 
CONTROL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Port Washington Water Pollution Control 
District Clerical Association has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties 
and described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
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negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Included: All Clerical/Office Staff. 
Excluded: Director, Superintendent, Assistant Business Manager, Field Unit 
Employees and Foremen. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Port Washington Water Pollution Control District Clerical 
Association. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any 
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: March 16,2005 
Albany, New York 
^ t . y . < —._, 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PORT WASHINGTON WATER POLLUTION 
CONTROL DISTRICT FOREMEN'S ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5472 
PORT WASHINGTON WATER POLLUTION 
CONTROL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Port Washington Water Pollution Control 
District Foremen's Association has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties 
and described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
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Included: All employees in the Foreman title. 
Excluded: Director, Superintendent, Assistant Business Manager, Field Unit 
employees and Clerical employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Port Washington Water Pollution Control District 
Foremen's Association. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual 
obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. Such 
obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of 
a concession. 
DATED: March 16, 2005 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING 
ENGINEERS LOCAL 832, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5491 
TOWN OF NAPLES, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the International Union of Operating Engineers 
Local 832 has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and 
the settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-5491 - 2 
Included: All highway department employees. 
Excluded: Superintendent of Higways. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
„negotiate collectivejy„with thejnternational Union of Operating,Engineers,Lo_caL832. 
The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: March 16,2005 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
